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Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Life¹

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To claim that sociolinguistics is a distinct field is to imply that there are both problems and types of linguistic data that have not been adequately considered before. Language, after all, is all around us, and its description is among the oldest of man's scientific enterprises. What does it mean to do a description of a sociolinguistic system, and how does this differ from doing a grammar of a language or dialect, mapping dialect boundaries, determining historical relationships, studying rules of rhetoric

¹ Revised from Hymes 1967, particularly elaborating the treatment of taxonomy and recasting the presentation of components of speaking. Many of the examples come from an examination of ethnographic data undertaken with support of the culture of Schools program of the Office of Education in 1966-1967. I am greatly indebted to Regna Darnell, Helen Hogan, Elinor Keenan, Susan Philips, Sheila Seitel, Joel Sherzer, K. M. Tiwary, and my wife, Virginia, for their participation in that work. My own thinking on the general problem has benefited from a small grant from the National Institute of Mental Health in spring 1968. I thank Meyer Fortes, Edmund Leach and J. L. M. Trim for discussion of some of these problems, and many kindnesses, while a visiting fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge, in 1968-1969.

and literary style, or analyzing the speech varieties characteristic of the various ethnic groups or social classes coresident in a particular region? Which of the many aspects of verbal behavior do we observe, and what concepts do we utilize in classifying what we observe to insure comparability of data? This chapter addresses itself to these issues. It is general in scope in that it suggests criteria for gathering information on rules of speaking rather than focusing on a particular social group. It is thus in a sense complementary to the chapters by Ervin-Tripp (Chapter 7), Bernstein (Chapter 17), and Garfinkel (Chapter 10), which deal with similarly general problems of theory and analysis.

Rules of speaking are the ways in which speakers associate particular modes of speaking, topics or message forms, with particular settings and activities. The concern is, first of all, with the attitudes and knowledge of the members of the community, as manifest in contrasts in native terminologies and conduct. Except for occasional references in ethnographies or grammatical descriptions of certain linguistically distinct special parlances (such as Vedic recitation styles, African praise singing, thieves argots, and the like) there is almost no systematic information on such matters. What ethnographic information we have suggests considerable cross-cultural variation in rules of speaking (see Albert, Chapter 2; Frake, Chapter 3; Philips 1970). Yet the range of this variation and its relation to social structure and linguistic form is as yet unknown. What is needed at this stage are new types of discovery procedures and concepts designed to facilitate the empirical collection of data.

Since one human groups's theories of speaking can best be isolated by contrast with those of another, the comparative approach to fieldwork is probably the most useful at this stage. Note, however, that the basic unit of analysis is a community or group rather than a language or dialect. Recent work with Afro-American speech groups in the urban United States highlights the importance of this distinction. Linguistically, urban Afro-American dialects (at least those of the urban northern United States) do not differ greatly from standard English. Yet Afro-American speakers differ radically from their white neighbors by the cultural emphasis they place

on speech acts such as "signifying," "sounding," "toasts," etc. Such speech acts, until quite recently, were almost unknown in the community at large, and the average white educator's ignorance of relevant rules of speaking has been responsible for perpetuating some rather tragic misconceptions about lower-class black children's low linguistic competence. Labov and his colleagues (1968) have shown that if, rather than studying black teen-agers' responses to psycholinguistic tests (which, after all, are quite unfamiliar and at times seem threatening to ghetto children), one studies performance in these typically black speech acts, children who in formal interviews seem almost nonverbal in fact, prove to be highly skilled in the use of English.

Emphasis on human groups rather than grammar per se does not mean a neglect of careful linguistic analysis. Both linguists and sociolinguists deal with linguistic form, but they do so from different perspectives. As Hymes puts it, "A linguistic sign is a relation between linguistic form and a linguistic value. A sociolinguistic feature is a relation between a form and a sociolinguistic value." Whereas linguists deal with dictionary meanings (denotation, or meaning abstracted from context), sociolinguists deal with what Sacks calls situated meaning (meaning mediated and sometimes transformed by rules of speaking) which reflects speakers attitudes to each other, and to their topics. [Sacks (see Chapter 11) provides one analysis of the process by which such meanings are communicated.] Sociolinguistic value is discussed either directly or indirectly in several chapters (Friedrich, Chapter 9; Fischer, Chapter 18; Labov, Chapter 19).

Note also Hymes' distinction between the marked or ordinary value of sociolinguistic features and the unmarked value of sociolinguistic features. This is analyzed formally in Geoghegan's study of address rules among the Samal of the southern Philippines (1970).

Although the term *ethnography of speaking* has only begun to gain currency, a number of studies recently completed, or still in progress, give evidence of growing scholarly interest. The field elicitation problems raised in the present paper are dealt with explicitly in Darnell and Sherzer's outline guide for the ethnographic study of speech use (Appendix), which lists some of the basic

questions to be covered by ethnographers interested in speech behavior. "A Field Manual for the Cross-Cultural Study of the Acquisition of Communicative Competence" (Slobin et al. 1967) also deals with relevant questions. Tanner (1967), Hogan (1967), Sankoff (1968), and Seitel (1969) provide additional related readings.

Diversity of speech has been singled out as the hallmark of sociolinguistics. Of this two things should be said. Underlying the diversity of speech within communities and in the conduct of individuals are systematic relations, relations that, just as social and grammatical structure, can be the object of qualitative inquiry. A long-standing failure to recognize and act on this fact puts many now in the position of wishing to apply a basic science that does not yet exist.

Diversity of speech presents itself as a problem in many sectors of life—education, national development, transcultural communication. When those concerned with such problems seek scientific cooperation, they must often be disappointed. There is as yet no body of systematic knowledge and theory. There is not even agreement on a mode of description of language in interaction with social life, one which, being explicit and of standard form, could facilitate development of knowledge and theory through studies that are full and comparable. There is not even agreement on the desirability or necessity of such a mode of description.

Bilingual or bidialectal phenomena have been the main focus of the interest that has been shown. Yet bilingualism is not in itself an adequate basis for a model or theory of the interaction of language and social life. From the standpoint of such a model or theory, bilingualism is neither a unitary phenomenon nor autonomous. The fact that two languages are present in a community or are part of a person's communicative competence is compatible with a variety of underlying functional (social) relationships. Conversely, distinct languages need not be present for the underlying relationships to find expression.

Bilingualism par excellence (e.g., French and English in Canada, Welsh and English in North Wales, Russian and French among prerevolutionary Russian nobility) is a salient, special case of the general phenomenon of linguistic repertoire. No normal person, and no normal community, is limited to a single way of speaking, to an unchanging monotony that would preclude indication of respect, insolence, mock seriousness, humor, role distance, and intimacy by switching from one mode of speech to another.

Given the universality of linguistic repertoires, and of switching among the ways of speaking they comprise, it is not necessary that the ways be

distinct languages. Relationships of social intimacy or of social distance may be signaled by switching between distinct languages [Spanish: Guarani in Paraguay (Rubin 1962, 1968)]; between varieties of a single language (standard German: dialect), or between pronouns within a single variety (German *Du:Sie*). Segregation of religious activity may be marked linguistically by a variety whose general unintelligibility depends on being of foreign provenance (e.g., Latin, Arabic in many communities), on being a derived variety of the common language [Zuni (Newman 1964)], or on being a manifestation not identifiable at all (some glosolalia). Conversely, shift between varieties may mark a shift between distinct spheres of activity [e.g., standard Norwegian: Hemnes dialect (see Blom and Gumperz, Chapter 14)], or the formal status of talk within a single integral activity [e.g., Siane in New Guinea (Salisbury 1962)], Latin in a contemporary Cambridge University degree ceremony (e.g., *Cambridge University Reporter* 1969).

A general theory of the interaction of language and social life must encompass the multiple relations between linguistic means and social meaning. The relations within a particular community or personal repertoire are an empirical problem, calling for a mode of description that is jointly ethnographic and linguistic.

If the community's own theory of linguistic repertoire and speech is considered (as it must be in any serious ethnographic account), matters become all the more complex and interesting. Some peoples, such as the Wishram Chinook of the Columbia River in what is now the state of Washington, or the Ashanti of Nigeria, have considered infants' vocalizations to manifest a special language (on the Wishram, see Hymes 1966a; on the Ashanti, Hogan 1967). For the Wishram, this language was interpretable only by men having certain guardian spirits. In such cases, the native language is in native theory a second language to everyone. Again, one community may strain to maintain mutual intelligibility with a second in the face of great differentiation of dialect, while another may declare intelligibility impossible, although the objective linguistic differences are minor. Cases indistinguishable by linguistic criteria may thus be now monolingual, now bilingual, depending on local social relationships and attitudes (discussed more fully in Hymes 1968c).

While it is common in a bilingual situation to look for specialization in the function, elaboration, and valuation of a language, such specialization is but an instance of a universal phenomenon, one that must be studied in situations dominantly monolingual as well. Language as such is not everywhere equivalent in role and value; speech may have different scope and functional load in the communicative economies of different societies. In our society sung and spoken communication intersect in song; pure speaking and instrumental music are separate kinds of communication. Among

the Flathead Indians of Montana, speech and songs without text are separate, while songs with text, and instrumental music as an aspect of songs with text, form the intersection. Among the Maori of New Zealand instrumental music is a part of song, and both are ultimately conceived as speech. [It is interesting to note that among both the Flathead and Maori it is supernatural context that draws speech and music together, and makes of both (and of animal sounds as well among the Flathead) forms of linguistic communication.]² With regard to speaking itself, while Malinowski has made us familiar with the importance of phatic communication, talk for the sake of something being said, the ethnographic record suggests that it is far from universally an important or even accepted motive (see Sapir 1949i:16, 11). The Paliyans of south India "communicate very little at all times and become almost silent by the age of 40. Verbal, communicative persons are regarded as abnormal and often as offensive" (Gardner 1966:398). The distribution of required and preferred silence, indeed, perhaps most immediately reveals in outline form a community's structure of speaking (see Samarin 1965; Basso 1970). Finally, the role of language in thought and culture (Whorf's query) obviously cannot be assessed for bilinguals until the role of each of their languages is assessed; but the same is true for monolinguals since in different societies language enters differentially into educational experience, transmission of beliefs, knowledge, values, practices, and conduct (see Hymes 1966a). Such differences may obtain even between different groups within a single society with a single language.

What is needed, then, is a general theory and body of knowledge within which diversity of speech, repertoires, ways of speaking, and choosing among them find a natural place. Such a theory and body of knowledge are only now being built in a sustained way. Social scientists asking relevant functional questions have usually not had the training and insight to deal adequately with the linguistic face of the problem. Linguistics, the discipline central to the study of speech, has been occupied almost wholly with developing analysis of the structure of language as a referential code, neglecting social meaning, diversity, and use. There have been notable exceptions (as in the work of Firth, Jakobson, and Sapir), but the main course of linguistic work has been from the then newly captured sector of phonology (before World War II) through morphology and syntax. Now that the inner logic of linguistics itself brings it to deal with semantics and speech acts, and now that the social sciences generally in the United States are engaged in the sort of cross-cultural and educational research that makes language differences of concern, there has emerged something tantamount to a movement to redress the situation. The movement is commonly called *sociolinguistics*, especially when seen as relating lan-

guage to sociological categories, or as mediating between linguistics and social science as a whole.

It is not necessary to think of sociolinguistics as a novel discipline. If linguistics comes to accept fully the sociocultural dimensions, social science the linguistic dimensions, of their subject matters and theoretical bases, sociolinguistic will simply identify a mode of research in adjacent sectors of each. As disciplines, one will speak simply of linguistics, anthropology, and the like (see Hymes 1964b, 1966b, 1970a, b, c). But, as just implied, the linguistics, anthropology, etc., of which one speaks will have changed. In order to develop models, or theories, of the interaction of language and social life, there must be adequate descriptions of that interaction, and such descriptions call for an approach that partly links, but partly cuts across, partly builds between the ordinary practices of the disciplines. This is what makes sociolinguistics exciting and necessary. It does not accept, but it is a critique of the present partitioning of the subject of man among the sciences of man. Its goal is to explain the meaning of language in human life, and not in the abstract, not in the superficial phrases one may encounter in essays and textbooks, but in the concrete, in actual human lives. To do that it must develop adequate modes of description and classification, to answer new questions and give familiar questions a novel focus.

The Case for Description and Taxonomy

For some of the most brilliant students of language in its social setting, the proper strategy is to select problems that contribute directly to current linguistic and social theory. A primary concern is relevant to particular problems already perceived as such in the existing disciplines, although the modes of work of those disciplines must often be transformed for the problems to find solutions. Field studies in societies exotic to the investigator, where strong control over data and hypothesis testing cannot easily be maintained, are not much valued. A concern to secure reports from such societies is thought pointless since it suggests a prospect of endless descriptions which, whatever their quantity and quality, would not as such contribute to theoretical discovery.

My own view is different. I accept an intellectual tradition, adumbrated in antiquity, and articulated in the course of the Enlightenment, which holds that mankind cannot be understood apart from the evolution and maintenance of its ethnographic diversity. A satisfactory understanding of the nature and unity of men must encompass and organize, not abstract from, the diversity. In this tradition, a theory, whatever its logic and insight, is inadequate if divorced from, if unilluminating as to, the ways of life of mankind as a whole. The concern is consonant with that of Kroeber, reflecting upon Darwin:

² These examples draw on a study by Judith Temkin Irvine (1968).

anthropologists . . . do not yet clearly recognize the fundamental value of the humble but indispensable task of classifying—that is, structuring, our body of knowledge, as biologists did begin to recognize it two hundred years ago (1960:14).

Even the ethnographies that we have, though almost never focused on speaking, show us that communities differ significantly in ways of speaking, in patterns of repertoire and switching, in the roles and meanings of speech. They indicate differences with regard to beliefs, values, reference groups, norms, and the like, as these enter into the ongoing system of language use and its acquisition by children. Individual accounts that individually pass without notice, as familiar possibilities, leap out when juxtaposed, as contrasts that require explanation. The Gbeya around the town of Bossangoa in the western Central African Republic, for example, are extremely democratic, and relatively unconcerned with speech. There is no one considered verbally excellent even with regard to traditional folklore. Moreover,

Gbeya parents and other adults focus little attention on the speech of children. No serious attempt is made to improve their language. In fact, a child only uncommonly takes part in a dyadic speech event with an adult Among the Gbeya “children are seen and not heard.” Finally, there appears to be very little interest in reporting *how* a person speaks . . . (Samarin 1969).

The Anang (Nigeria) received their name from neighboring Ibo, the term meaning “ability to speak wittily yet meaningfully upon any occasion.”

The Anang take great pride in their eloquence, and youth are trained from early childhood to develop verbal skills. This proverb riddle [not quoted here, but see discussion] instructs young people to assume adult duties and responsibilities as early as possible, even if doing so is difficult and unpleasant at times. As the vine must struggle to escape growing into the pit [the riddle], so must the child strive to overcome his shyness and insecurity and learn to speak publicly [the proverbial answer], as well as perform other adult roles (Messenger 1960:229).

Or, to consider the word and the sword, among the Araucanians of Chile the head of a band was its best orator, and his power depended upon his ability to sway others through oratory. Among the Abipon of Argentina no desired role or status depended upon skill in speaking; chiefs and members of the one prestigious men’s group were selected solely on the basis of success in battle. The Iroquois value eloquence in chiefs and orators as much as bravery in war; the two are usually mentioned together and with equal status. A chief could rise equally quickly by either.

Since there is no systematic understanding of the ways in which communities differ in these respects, and of the deeper relationships such differences may disclose, we have it to create. We need taxonomies of speaking, and descriptions adequate to support and test them.

Such description and taxonomy will share in the work of providing an adequate classification of languages. If the task of language classification is taken to be to place languages in terms of their common features and differences, and if we consider the task from the standpoint of similarities, then four classifications are required. Languages are classified according to features descended from a common ancestor (genetic classification), features diffused within a common area (areal classification), features manifesting a common structure or structures, irrespective of origin or area (typological classification), and features of common use or social role (as koine, standard language, pidgin, etc.) (functional classification) (see Hymes 1968c; Greenburg 1968:133–135). The processes underlying the classifications (various kinds of retention, divergence, convergence) all can be viewed in terms of the adaption of languages to social contexts, but the forms of classification in which the dependence on social processes can be most readily excluded (genetic, typological) are the forms that have been most developed. Sociolinguistic research reinforces the intermittent interest that areal classification has received, and can properly claim the most neglected sector, functional classification, the interaction between social role and features of languages, for its own. The natural unit for sociolinguistic taxonomy (and description), however, is not the language but the speech community.

Of course, sociolinguistic taxonomy is not an end in itself, any more than is language classification. A taxonomy is not in itself a theory or explanation, though it may conceal or suggest one. There will indeed be a variety of taxonomies, answering to a variety of significant dimensions, as well as taxonomies of whole communities, societies, and social fields. (For a step in the latter direction, see Ferguson 1966.) The work of taxonomy is a necessary part of progress toward models (structural and generative) of sociolinguistic description, formulation of universal sets of features and relations, and explanatory theories. (I shall say something about each of these later.) Just the demonstration that the phenomena of speaking are subject to comparative study may help end the obscuring of actual problems by descant on the function of language in general. Those who do so should be received as if they were continuing to discuss physics in terms of the Ionian controversies as to the primordial element.³

³ For recent examples of uncritical praise and intransigent indictment of language, see J. O. Hertzler 1965 and Brice Parain 1969. On “high and low evaluations of language” as an integral part of the history of philosophy and human culture, see Urban 1939:12, 23–32.

An Illustration

As an indication of what can be done, as well as of how much there is to be done, let me briefly consider the grossest, and most likely to be reported, aspect of speech, quantity. Contrasts were drawn already in antiquity, although amounting only to folk characterization, as when the Athenian says to his Spartan and Cretan interlocutors,

But first let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the Cretans have more wit than words. Now I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small matter (Plato, *Laws* 641E).⁴

One could extract a dimension with three points of contrast, naming the types according to the dialogue (as kinship systems are named after societies in which they are identified, Crow, Omah, and the like):

i			
Dimension:	<i>verbose</i>	<i>laconic</i>	<i>pithy</i>
Type:	ATHENIAN	SPARTAN	CRETAN

A number of analytically different dimensions are probably confounded within gross observations as to quantity of speech, length and frequency of speech, and the like; and there are qualitative characteristics vital to the interaction of language with social life in the particular societies. Something of this appears in the quotation from Plato, and becomes explicit in the following contrast:

ii			
Dimension:	<i>voluble</i>	<i>reserved, reticent</i>	<i>taciturn</i>
Type:	BELLA COOLA	ARITAMA	PALIYAN

BELLA COOLA (British Columbia). Fluent, interesting speech is valued, and a common, if not a requisite, part of social life. Essential roles in ceremonial activity, and an important spirit impersonated in the Kusiut initiation, had to have the ability to talk constantly, keeping up a flow of witty and insulting remarks. The ethnographer McIlwraith found that if he could not joke with them constantly, people lost interest. When groups talked, one was sure to hear bursts of laughter every few minutes.

⁴ According to Sandys (1920, 1:4), the noun *philologia* is first found in Plato, and its adjective, *philologos*, is used in this passage to contrast "lover of discourse" with "hater of discourse." Plato, *Laws* 641E, quoted from Benjamin E. Jowett's translation of *Dialogues* (New York: Random House, 1937, Vol. 2, p. 423).

ARITAMA (Colombia).

People in Aritama are not much given to friendly chatting and visiting. They are controlled and taciturn,⁵ evasive and monosyllabic . . . This reserve . . . is not only displayed toward strangers, but characterizes their own interpersonal contacts as well. There is a front of ready answers and expression, of standard affirmations and opinions, and there is always, in the last resort, the blank stare, the deaf ear or the sullen *no se* . . . Such behavior . . . leads frequently to a highly patterned type of confabulation (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1961:xvii).

PALIYAN (south India). See previous quotation from Gardner (1966). According to Gardner, the many hunting-and-gathering societies of the world should be divided into two types, of one of which the Paliyans are a perhaps extreme representative.

The dimensions may, of course, apply within, as well as between, societies, as to groups, cultural content, verbal style, and situations. As to groups,

iiia			
Dimension:	<i>voluble</i>		<i>taciturn</i>
Type:		ARAUCANIAN	
Subcategory:	<i>Men</i>		<i>Women</i>

ARAUCANIAN (Chile). The ideal Araucanian man is a good orator, with good memory, general conversationalist, expected to speak well and often. Men are encouraged to talk on all occasions, speaking being a sign of masculine intelligence and leadership. The ideal woman is submissive and quiet, silent in her husband's presence. At gatherings where men do much talking, women sit together listlessly, communicating only in whispers or not at all. On first arriving in her husband's home, a wife is expected to sit silently facing the wall, not looking anyone directly in the face. Only after several months is she permitted to speak, and then, only a little. Sisters-in-law do not speak much to each other. The one means by which women can express their situation is a form of social singing (*ulkantun*) in which mistreatment, disregard, and distress can be expressed. The one approved role for a woman to be verbally prominent is a shamanistic intermediary of a spirit (Hilger 1957). [Silence is expected of a bride in her new home in a number of cultures, e.g., traditional Korea. The restriction of women's expression of grievances to certain occasions and a musical use of voice also is widespread, as in Bihar (India).]

⁵ Although the Reichel-Dolmatoffs use "taciturn" here of the Aritama, the subsequent term "reserved" characterizes them well, while "taciturn" is specifically apt for the Paliyans. As taxonomy and description develop, careful explication of technical terms will be increasingly important. Note that the three groups are also respectively "now-coding," "then-coding," and "non-coding" (cf. footnote 7).

As to situations,

iii b	<i>discursive disclosure</i>	<i>reticent quotation</i>
Dimension:		
Type:	WISHRAM-WASCO CHINOOK	
Scene: (See discussion)		

WISHRAM-WASCO CHINOOK (Washington, Oregon). Recitation of myths in winter, public conferral of personal name, and disclosure of an adolescent guardian spirit experience upon approaching death are three major communicative events. In each event, discursive disclosure (of the myth as a whole, the identification of name and person, or the verbal message of the vision) comes only when an implicit relationship (of culture to nature, person to reincarnated kin-linked "title," or person to personal spirit) has been validated. Each is part of a cycle—the annual round of society, a cycle of reinstituting names of deceased kin, an individual life cycle from adolescence to death. At other times during the cycle there may be quotations (of a detail in a myth, a name in address, a song from one's vision in winter spirit dance), but the substance of the relationship must not be explicitly stated. In each case of discursive disclosure the speaker is a spokesman, repeating words previously said, this being the rule that constitutes formal speech events. (See Hymes 1966a.)

As to cultural content,

iv	<i>verbal elaboration</i>	<i>verbal sparseness</i>
Dimension:		
Type:	HIDATSA	CROW

HIDATSA (North Dakota). CROW (Montana). According to Lowie (1917:87-88), "The culture of the Hidatsa differs from that of the Crow not merely by the greater number and elaboration of discrete features but also in a marked trait of their social psychology—the tendency towards rationalization and systematization." Lowie illustrates the contrast in four domains: formal instruction; accounting for cultural phenomena; individual interpretation and conception of names, myths, and prayer; and kinship nomenclature. In each domain the Hidatsa use language to systematize and stabilize the cultural universe to an extent greatly in contrast to the Crow. (It was the Crow that Lowie knew more intimately; hence his sense of greater Hidatsa elaboration is trustworthy). Of particular interest here is the following:

The Crow child . . . seems to have grown up largely without formal instruction. Even on so vital a matter as the securing of supernatural favor, the adolescent Crow was not urged by his elders but came more or less automatically to imitate his associates . . . With the Hidatsa everything seems to have been ordered and

prearranged by parental guidance; the father repeatedly admonished his sons, at the same time giving them specific instructions.⁶

As to verbal style,

v	<i>elaborate, profuse</i>	<i>restrained, sparse</i>
Dimension:		
Type:	ENGLISH	YOKUTS

ENGLISH, YOKUTS (California). A contrast with regard to the limits of acceptable use of syntactic possibilities has been drawn by Newman, who tries to sketch each from the standpoint of the other. Sparseness and restraint are found to characterize Yokuts narrative style as well (Gayton and Newman 1940).

Work in societies, with the goals of taxonomy and descriptive models in mind, is interdependent with detailed work in one's own society. Each provides insight and a test of universality and adequacy for the other. It has been suggested, for example, that there is only a class-linked British relevance to Bernstein's sociological model of elaborated vs. restricted coding, governed by personal vs. positional types of social control.⁷ While some Americans indeed have misapplied Bernstein's two types to ethnic and class differences in the United States, from the standpoint of taxonomy and description, the model takes on a new scope. It suggests a set of universal dimensions, and possibly polar ideal types, isolable and applicable to the description and comparison of situations and whole communities, as well as particular groups.

Thus Margaret Mead has analyzed the Arapesh and Iatmul of New Guinea as contrasting types of society in which the adult patterns seem appropriately interpreted as *personal* and *positional*, respectively. In the ARAPESH type (which includes the Andamanese, Ojibwa, and Eskimo), societies depend, for impetus to or inhibition of community action in public situations, upon the continuing response of individuals. The point

⁶ As the initial quotation indicates, Lowie did not relate the contrast explicitly to the role of language in social life. A major task and methodological challenge is to go beyond superficial presence or absence of overt mention of speech, in order to restate existing ethnographic analyses, wherever possible, in terms of speaking, just as it is often possible to find in earlier accounts of languages evidence permitting restatement in terms of contemporary phonological and grammatical models. Such restatement is more than an exercise; it contributes to the range of cases for comparative studies.

⁷ Elaborated codes are largely *now-coding*, and adaptive in lexicon and syntax to the ad hoc elaboration of subjective intent, while restricted codes are largely *then-coding*, and adaptive to the reinforcement of group solidarity through use of preformulated expressions. Personal social control appeals to individual characteristics, role discretion, and motivation; positional social control bases itself on membership in categories of age, sex, class, and the like. See Bernstein's chapter in this volume. Mead (1937) places Zuni also as a type intermediate between Iatmul and Bali (cf. also footnote 5).

of communication is to excite interest and bring together persons who will then respond with emotion to whatever event has occurred. In the IATMUL type the societies depend upon formal alignments of individuals, who react not in terms of personal opinions but in terms of defined position in a formal sociopolitical structure.

At the same time the comparative perspective extends the model. Mead identifies a third type of society, such as that of BALI, which does not depend on situations in which individuals express or can be called upon to express themselves for or against something, so as to affect the outcome regarding it, but which functions by invoking participation in and respect for known impersonal patterns or codes, and in which communicators act as if the audience were already in a state of suspended, unemotional attention, and only in need of a small precise triggering of words to set them off into appropriate activity. Mead interprets the differences as ones in which political feeling depends on "How do I (and A, B, and C) feel about it?" (Arapesh); "How does my group (their group) feel about it?" (Iatmul); and "How does this fit in?" (Bali). Such a type as Bali seems appropriately labeled one of *traditional* social control and communication. (Obviously, only a subset of the societies lumped together as "traditional" by some social scientists can be said to be so in a useful way.) (See Mead 1937, 1948; the latter article discusses Manus as well.) Keesing and Keesing (1956:258) suggest Samoa as a type combining Iatmul and Bali characteristics, but distinctive, so that one might have:

	personal	positional ⁸	traditional	positional, traditional
Dimension:				
Type:	ARAPESH	IATMUL	BALI	SAMOA

Comparative ethnographic examples show the need to separate sometimes the dimensions joined together in Bernstein's model. Iatmul is a society with important development of oratory, which might seem an instance of elaboration which should go with personal control. If the oratory is then-coding, employing largely preformulated expressions, there is, in fact, no discrepancy. Positional and personal social control do, however, cross-cut then-coding and now-coding to define four types of cases, not just two. Cat Harbour, Newfoundland, as described by Faris (1966, 1968), shows positional social control and restriction of personal expression in speech and other normally scheduled activities. As in most societies, there are certain situations marked as reversals of normal conduct (e.g., legitimated stealing of food); and, as if to compensate for

⁸ Mead (1937) places Zuni also as a type intermediate between Iatmul and Bali.

plainness of life and to satisfy the great interest in "news" of any kind, while remaining within normal restraints, there has arisen a genre known as the "cuffer." A "cuffer" may arise spontaneously, or someone may be asked to start one. It consists of developing an intense argument over an unimportant detail (such as how many men actually were lost in a boatwreck some decades back); but to show personal emotional involvement brings shame and exclusion. We thus find elaborated now-coding, indeed, extensive invention, in a positional setting. There can be then-coding in a situation of ad hoc subjective intent as well, as when Ponapeans arrive at the status of mutual lovers through manipulating a long sequence of verbal formulas which allow for role discretion at each step (Paul Garvin, personal communication), or when a traditional saying is used precisely because its impersonal, preformulated character grants role discretion to another that direct rebuke would not (e.g., the Chaga of Central Africa use proverbs to children in this way).⁹

Relevant Features and Types. The examples just presented show that it is essential to isolate the dimensions and features underlying taxonomic categories. These features and dimensions, more than particular constellations of them, will be found to be universal, and hence elementary to descriptive and comparative frames of reference. This is not to consider universal features and dimensions the only goal. Explanation faces two ways, toward the generic possibilities and general constraints, on the one hand (Chomsky's "essentialist" form of explanatory adequacy), and toward the types that are historically realized and their causes (an "existential" or "experiential" form of explanatory adequacy), on the other. The heuristics of description require an etics of types as well as of elements, for insight into the organization intrinsic to a case, as against a priori or mechanical structuring of it.

By both defining some universal dimensions of speaking and proposing explanation within social theory of certain constellations of them, Bernstein has shown the goal toward which sociolinguistic work must proceed.

⁹ The contrast between Hopi and Zuni, on the one hand, and the Wishram Chinook (Hymes 1967:12) was incorrectly drawn. Among both socialization pressure is initially withheld with regard to toilet training and the like until the child can talk (Dennis 1940, Eggan 1948 [1943]; on the significance of early socialization pressure, though without reference to ways of speaking, Whiting and Child 1953:254 ff.). The sudden shift from indulgence to control among the Hopi apparently came after the first few years of life (Eggan 1948 [1943]:232-233). It is the subsequent difference between "positional" (Hopi) and "personal" social control that would seem to fit with the differences in adult religious experience, together with the shock of public disillusion in the kachinas for Hopi children at an age (7-10) when Wishram children were training for private spiritual encounters of which they themselves would be individually the interpreters and eventual disclosers. It remains that such contrasts as that between Hopi and Chinookan relations to the supernatural, and as between prayer as beseeching petition (e.g., the Delaware) and prayer as "compulsive word" (e.g., the Navaho) need to be related to speech socialization.

The total range of dimensions and of kinds of explanation, to be sure, will be more varied. Indeed, the fact that present taxonomic dimensions consist so largely of dichotomies—restricted vs. elaborated codes, transactional vs. metaphorical switching, referential vs. expressive meaning, standard vs. nonstandard speech, formal vs. informal scenes, literacy vs. illiteracy—shows how preliminary is the stage at which we work. With regard to ways of speaking, we are at a stage rather like that of the study of human culture, as a whole, a century ago, when Tyler, Morgan, and others had to segregate relevant sets of data, and give definiteness and name to some of the elementary categories on which subsequent work could be built (on Tylor, see Lowie 1937:70–71; Tylor 1871, Chapter 1).

Like Tylor and Morgan, we need to establish elementary categories and names. Among the Bella Coola of British Columbia, for instance, there is a genre such that at the investiture of an inheritor of a privilege validated by a myth, someone tells a public audience kept outside just enough of the recited myth to be convincing as to the validation, but not so much as to give it away (knowledge of the myth itself being part of the privilege) (McIlwraith 1948). Among the Iatmul of New Guinea knowledge of the correct version of a myth may also be proof of a claim, in this instance to land and group membership. In public debate a speaker refers to his myth in clichés that fragment the plot. In this way “he demonstrates his membership in a group and at the same time keeps outsiders in the dark as to the esoteric matrix of the story” (Mead 1964b:74). We lack a name for this recurrent way of speaking. Identifying it would increase the chances that others will notice and report it in ways that will lead to knowledge of the conditions under which it occurs in various parts of the world.

Anthropological contributions to this branch of comparative research are almost nonexistent. Even a list of terms lacking careful definition is to be noted (Keesing and Keesing 1956); careful description and analysis of named concepts is remarkable (Calame-Griaule 1965; Abrahams and Bauman 1970). There are no books on comparative speaking to put beside those on comparative religion, comparative politics, and the like. In the major anthropological collection of data for comparative studies, the Human Relations Area Files, information on ways of speaking is only sporadically included and is scattered among several categories. Existing manuals and guides for ethnography, or for specific aspects, such as socialization, largely neglect speech.

The first break in this neglect is the pioneering field manual prepared by a group at Berkeley (Slobin 1967). The manual has already contributed to (and benefited from) the research of a number of fieldworkers. It is important to note that it is *acquisition* of the *structure* of language with regard to which the manual can be most detailed. The linguistic code takes pride of place as to topics, procedures, and specific questions and hypo-

theses, even though the acquisition of linguistic codes is in principle recognized as but part of the acquisition of communicative competence as a whole. It is recognized that “before a description of the child’s language acquisition can be undertaken, the conventions of the adult members of the group must be described” (Slobin 1967:161), but it has not been found possible to make such description the initial matrix of research, nor to show what such description would be like, beyond sketching a conceptual framework with illustrations.

An ethnographic guide, focusing on the acquisition of speaking as a whole (prepared by a group initially at the University of Pennsylvania), is now in press (Hymes et al., 1972). An outline is included as an appendix to this volume. The full form will have queries in considerably more detail, together with ethnographic examples and sketches of cultural types.

The need for etics (Pike 1967, Chapter 2) of terms and types, as an input to description, is clear from the frequency with which fieldworkers have let observations of great interest lie fallow, lacking precedent and format for their presentation. There is need to show ethnographers and linguists a way to *see* data as ways of speaking. At this juncture we are still attempting to achieve “observational adequacy” in the sense of being able to adequately record what is there in acts of speech.

For an adequate etics we of course most need field studies of the sort the manual and guide just cited encourage. We can also make useful ethnographic accounts not obtained with analysis of speaking in mind, by a procedure that can be called “sociolinguistic restatement” (see Hymes 1966a; Hogan 1967; Sherzer 1970). We must draw as well on the accumulated insight of all the fields that deal with speech, rhetoric, literary criticism, and the like. To be sure, the terminologies of rhetoric and literary criticism fall short of the range to be encompassed. Terminology for ways of speaking seems not to have developed much since the heyday of rhetorical education in the Renaissance—the recent revival of interest in rhetorical analysis indeed returns to the starting point (see Joseph 1962; Lanham 1968; Sonnino 1968). But treatments of verbal art of necessity draw distinctions and make assumptions as to notions with which a descriptive model of speaking must deal, as does much work in philosophy, most notably in recent years “ordinary language” philosophy and the work of J. L. Austin, John Searle, and others on “illocutionary acts,” or performatives. Several philosophers, psychologists, and literary critics, as well as linguists, have proposed classifications of the components of the functions served in them (Karl Bühler, Kenneth Burke, Roman Jakobson, Bronislaw Malinowski, Charles Morris, C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, B. F. Skinner, William Soskin, and Vera John). Much is to be hoped from the growing interest of folklorists in the analysis of verbal performance (see Hymes 1970b). A systematic explication of these contributions is greatly to be desired. These lines of work provide concepts

and insights from which much can be learned, and for which a comparative ethnography of speaking can perform anthropology's traditional scientific role, testing of universality and empirical adequacy.

In sum, just as a theory of grammar must have its universal terms, so must a theory of language use. It can indeed be argued that the notions of such a theory are foundational to linguistics proper (see Hymes 1964b, where the theory is called "(ethno)linguistic"). The fundamental problem—to discover and explicate the competence that enables members of a community to conduct and interpret speech—cuts deeper than any schema any of us have so far developed.

Toward a Descriptive Theory

The primary concern now must be with descriptive analyses from a variety of communities. Only in relation to actual analysis will it be possible to conduct arguments analogous to those now possible in the study of grammar as to the adequacy, necessity, generality, etc., of concepts and terms. Yet some initial heuristic schema are needed if the descriptive task is to proceed. What is presented here is quite preliminary—if English and its grammarians permitted, one might call it "toward toward a theory." Some of it may survive the empirical and analytical work of the decade ahead.

Only a specific, explicit mode of description can guarantee the maintenance and success of the current interest in sociolinguistics. Such interest is prompted more by practical and theoretical needs, perhaps, than by accomplishment. It was the development of a specific mode of description that ensured the success of linguistics as an autonomous discipline in the United States in the twentieth century, and the lack of it (for motif and tale types are a form of indexing, distributional inference a procedure common to the human sciences) that led to the until recently peripheral status of folklore, although both had started from a similar base, the converging interest of anthropologists, and English scholars, in language and in verbal tradition.

The goal of sociolinguistic description can be put in terms of the disciplines whose interests converge in sociolinguistics. Whatever his questions about language, it is clear to a linguist that there is an enterprise, description of languages, which is central and known. Whatever his questions about society and culture, it is clear to a sociologist or an anthropologist that there is a form of inquiry (survey or ethnography) on which the answers depend. In both cases, one understands what it means to describe a language, the social relations, or culture of a community. We need to be able to say the same thing about the sociolinguistic system of a community.

Such a goal is of concern to practical work as well as to scientific theory.

In a study of bilingual education, e.g., certain components of speaking will be taken into account, and the choice will presuppose a model, implicit if not explicit, of the interaction of language with social life. The significance attached to what is found will depend on understanding what is possible, what universal, what rare, what linked, in comparative perspective. What survey researchers need to know linguistically about a community, in selecting a language variety, and in conducting interviews, is in effect an application of the community's sociolinguistic description (see Hymes 1969). In turn, practical work, if undertaken with its relevance to theory in mind, can make a contribution, for it must deal directly with the interaction of language and social life, and so provides a testing ground and source of new insight.

Sociolinguistic systems may be treated at the level of national states, and indeed, of an emerging world society. My concern here is with the level of individual communities and groups. The interaction of language with social life is viewed as first of all a matter of human action, based on a knowledge, sometimes conscious, often unconscious, that enables persons to use language. Speech events and larger systems indeed have properties not reducible to those of the speaking competence of persons. Such competence, however, underlies communicative conduct, not only within communities but also in encounters between them. The speaking competence of persons may be seen as entering into a series of systems of encounter at levels of different scope.

An adequate descriptive theory would provide for the analysis of individual communities by specifying technical concepts required for such analysis, and by characterizing the forms that analysis should take. Those forms would, as much as possible, be formal, i.e., explicit, general (in the sense of observing general constraints and conventions as to content, order, interrelationship, etc.), economical, and congruent with linguistic modes of statement. Only a good deal of empirical work and experimentation will show what forms of description are required, and of those, which preferable. As with grammar, approximation to a theory for the explicit, standard analysis of individual systems will also be an approximation to part of a theory of explanation.

Among the notions with which such a theory must deal are those of speech community, speech situation, speech event, speech act, fluent speaker, components of speech events, functions of speech, etc.

SOCIAL UNITS

One must first consider the social unit of analysis. For this I adopt the common expression *speech community*.

Speech Community. Speech is here taken as a surrogate for all forms of language, including writing, song and speech-derived whistling, drum-

ming, horn calling, and the like. Speech community is a necessary, primary term in that it postulates the basis of description as a social, rather than a linguistic, entity. One starts with a social group and considers all the linguistic varieties present in it, rather than starting with any one variety.

Bloomfield (1933) and some others have in the past reduced the notion of speech community to the notion of language (or linguistic variety). Those speaking the same language (or same first language, or standard language) were defined as members of the same speech community. This confusion still persists, associated with a quantitative measure of frequency of interaction as a way of describing (in principle) internal variation and change, as speculatively postulated by Bloomfield. The present approach requires a definition that is qualitative and expressed in terms *norms for the use of language*. It is clear from the work of Gumperz, Labov, Barth, and others that not frequency of interaction but rather definition of situations in which interaction occurs is decisive, particularly identification (or lack of it) with others. [Sociolinguistics here makes contact with the shift in rhetorical theory from expression and persuasion to identification as key concept (see Burke 1950:19-37, 55-59).]

Tentatively, a *speech community* is defined as a community sharing rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech, and rules for the interpretation of at least one linguistic variety. Both conditions are necessary.

The sharing of grammatical (variety) rules is not sufficient. There may be persons whose English I can grammatically identify but whose messages escape me. I may be ignorant of what counts as a coherent sequence, request, statement requiring an answer, requisite or forbidden topic, marking of emphasis or irony, normal duration of silence, normal level of voice, etc., and have no metacommunicative means or opportunity for discovering such things. The difference between knowledge of a variety and knowledge of speaking does not usually become apparent within a single community, where the two are normally acquired together. Communities indeed often mingle what a linguist would distinguish as grammatically and as socially or culturally acceptable. Among the Cochiti of New Mexico J. R. Fox was unable to elicit the first person singular possessive form of "wings," on the grounds that the speaker, not being a bird, could not say "my wings"—only to become the only person in Cochiti able to say it on the grounds that "your name is Robin."

The nonidentity of the two kinds of rules (or norms) is more likely to be noticed when a shared variety is a second language for one or both parties. Sentences that translate each other grammatically may be mistakenly taken as having the same functions in speech, just as words that translate each other may be taken as having the same semantic function. There may be substratum influence, or interference (Weinreich 1953) in the one as in the other. The Czech linguist J. Neustupny has coined the

term *Sprechbund* "speech area" (parallel to *Sprachbund* "language area") for the phenomenon of speaking rules being shared among contiguous languages. Thus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and southern Germany may be found to share norms as to greetings, acceptable topics, what is said next in a conversation, etc.

Sharing of speaking rules is not sufficient. A Czech who knows no German may belong to the same *Sprechbund*, but not the same speech community, as an Austrian.

The *language field* and *speech field* (akin to the notion of social field) can be defined as the total range of communities within which a person's knowledge of varieties and speaking rules potentially enables him to move communicatively. Within the speech field must be distinguished the *speech network*, the specific linkages of persons through shared varieties and speaking rules across communities. Thus in northern Queensland, Australia, different speakers of the same language (e.g., Yir Yoront) may have quite different networks along geographically different circuits, based on clan membership, and involving different repertoires of multilingualism. In Vitiaz Strait, New Guinea, the Bilibili islanders (a group of about 200-250 traders and potmakers in Astrolabe Bay) have collectively a knowledge of the languages of all the communities with which they have had economic relations, a few men knowing the language of each particular community in which they have had trading partners.

In sum, one's speech community may be, effectively, a single locality or portion of it; one's language field will be delimited by one's repertoire of varieties; one's speech field by one's repertoire of patterns of speaking. One's speech network is the effective union of these last two.

Part of the work of definition obviously is done here by the notion of community, whose difficulties are bypassed, as are the difficulties of defining boundaries between varieties and between patterns of speaking. Native conceptions of boundaries are but one factor in defining them, essential but sometimes partly misleading (a point stressed by Gumperz on the basis of his work in central India). Self-conceptions, values, role structures, contiguity, purposes of interaction, political history, all may be factors. Clearly, the same degree of linguistic difference may be associated with a boundary in one case and not in another, depending on social factors. The essential thing is that the object of description be an integral social unit. Probably, it will prove most useful to reserve the notion of speech community for the local unit most specifically characterized for a person by common locality and primary interaction (Gumperz 1962: 30-32). Here I have drawn distinctions of scale and of kind of linkage within what Gumperz has termed the *linguistic community* (any distinguishable intercommunicating group). Descriptions will make it possible to develop a useful typology and to discover the causes and consequences of the various types.

Speech Situation. Within a community one readily detects many situations associated with (or marked by the absence of) speech. Such contexts of situation will often be naturally described as ceremonies, fights, hunts, meals, lovemaking, and the like. It would not be profitable to convert such situations en masse into parts of a sociolinguistic description by the simple expedient of relabeling them in terms of speech. (Notice that the distinctions made with regard to speech community are not identical with the concepts of a general communicative approach, which must note the differential range of communication by speech, film, art object, music.) Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such rules, or one set of such rules throughout. A hunt, e.g., may comprise both verbal and nonverbal events, and the verbal events may be of more than one type.

In a sociolinguistic description, then, it is necessary to deal with activities which are in some recognizable way bounded or integral. From the standpoint of general social description they may be registered as ceremonies, fishing trips, and the like; from particular standpoints they may be regarded as political, esthetic, etc., situations, which serve as contexts for the manifestation of political, esthetic, etc., activity. From the sociolinguistic standpoint they may be regarded as speech situations.

Speech Event. The term *speech event* will be restricted to activities, or aspects of activities, that are directly governed by rules or norms for the use of speech. An event may consist of a single speech act, but will often comprise several. Just as an occurrence of a noun may at the same time be the whole of a noun phrase and the whole of a sentence (e.g., "Fire!"), so a speech act may be the whole of a speech event, and of a speech situation (say, a rite consisting of a single prayer, itself a single invocation). More often, however, one will find a difference in magnitude: a party (speech situation), a conversation during the party (speech event), a joke within the conversation (speech act). It is of speech events and speech acts that one writes formal rules for their occurrence and characteristics. Notice that the same type of speech act may recur in different types of speech event, and the same type of speech event in different contexts of situation. Thus, a joke (speech act) may be embedded in a private conversation, a lecture, a formal introduction. A private conversation may occur in the context of a party, a memorial service, a pause in changing sides in a tennis match.

Speech Act. The *speech act* is the minimal term of the set just discussed, as the remarks on speech events have indicated. It represents a level distinct from the sentence, and not identifiable with any single portion of other levels of grammar, nor with segments of any particular size defined

in terms of other levels of grammar. That an utterance has the status of a command may depend upon a conventional formula ("I hereby order you to leave this building"), intonation ("Go!" vs. "Go?"), position in a conversational exchange ["Hello" as initiating greeting or as response (perhaps used when answering the telephone)], or the social relationship obtaining between the two parties (as when an utterance that is in the form a polite question is in effect a command when made by a superior to a subordinate). The level of speech acts mediates immediately between the usual levels of grammar and the rest of a speech event or situation in that it implicates both linguistic form and social norms.

To some extent speech acts may be analyzable by extensions of syntactic and semantic structure. It seems certain, however, that much, if not most, of the knowledge that speakers share as to the status of utterances as acts is immediate and abstract, depending upon an autonomous system of signals from both the various levels of grammar and social settings. To attempt to depict speech acts entirely by postulating an additional segment of underlying grammatical structure (e.g., "I hereby X you to . . .") is cumbersome and counterintuitive. (Consider the case in which "Do you think I might have that last bit of tea?" is to be taken as a command.)

An autonomous level of speech acts is in fact implicated by that logic of linguistic levels according to which the ambiguity of "the shooting of the blacks was terrible" and the commonality of "topping Erv is almost impossible" and "it's almost impossible to top Erv" together requires a further level of structure at which the former has two different structures, the latter one. The relation between sentence forms and their status as speech acts is of the same kind. A sentence interrogative in form may be now a request, now a command, now a statement; a request may be manifested by a sentence that is now interrogative, now declarative, now imperative in form.

Discourse may be viewed in terms of acts both syntagmatically and paradigmatically; i.e., both as a sequence of speech acts and in terms of classes of speech acts among which choice has been made at given points.

Speech Styles. Style has often been approached as a matter of statistical frequency of elements already given in linguistic description, or as deviation from some norm given by such description. Statistics and deviations matter, but do not suffice. Styles also depend upon qualitative judgments of appropriateness, and must often be described in terms of selections that apply globally to a discourse, as in the case of honorific usage in Japanese (McCawley 1968:136), i.e., there are consistent patternings of speaking that cut across the components of grammar (phonology, syntax, semantics), or that operate within one independently of the selectional restrictions normally described for it. Whorf adumbrated as much in his conception of "fashions of speaking"; Joos has made and illustrated the point

with regard to English; Pike (1967) has considered a wide variety of contextual styles as conditions on the manifestation of phonological and morphological units. Besides the existence of qualitatively defined styles, there are two other points essential to sociolinguistic description. One is that speech styles involve elements and relations that conventionally serve "expressive" or, better, stylistic, as well as referential function (e.g., the contrast in force of aspiration that conventionally signals emphasis in English). The second point is that speech styles are to be considered not only in terms of cooccurrence within each but also in terms of contrastive choice among them. Like speech acts, they have both syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions. (Ervin-Tripp treats rules of cooccurrence and of alternation in detail in Chapter 7.) The coherence, or cohesion, of discourse depends upon the syntagmatic relation of speech acts, and speech styles, as well as of semantic and syntactic features.

Ways of Speaking. *Ways of speaking* is used as the most general, indeed, as a primitive, term. The point of it is the regulative idea that the communicative behavior within a community is analyzable in terms of determinate ways of speaking, that the communicative competence of persons comprises in part a knowledge of determinate ways of speaking. Little more can be said until a certain number of ethnographic descriptions of communities in terms of ways of speaking are available. It is likely that communities differ widely in the features in terms of which their ways of speaking are primarily organized.

Components of Speech. A descriptive theory requires some schema of the components of speech acts. At present such a schema can be only an etic, heuristic input to descriptions. Later it may assume the status of a theory of universal features and dimensions.

Long traditional in our culture is the threefold division between speaker, hearer, and something spoken about. It has been elaborated in information theory, linguistics, semiotics, literary criticism, and sociology in various ways. In the hands of some investigators various of these models have proven productive, but their productivity has depended upon not taking them literally, let alone using them precisely. All such schemes, e.g., appear to agree either in taking the standpoint of an individual speaker or in postulating a dyad, speaker-hearer (or source-destination, sender-receiver, addressor-addressee). Even if such a scheme is intended to be a model, for descriptive work it cannot be. Some rules of speaking require specification of *three* participants [addressor, addressee, hearer (audience), source, spokesman, addressees; etc.]; some of but *one*, indifferent as to role in the speech event; some of *two*, but of speaker and audience (e.g., a child); and so on. In short, serious ethnographic work shows that there is one general, or universal, dimension to be postulated,

that of *participant*. The common dyadic model of speaker-hearer specifies sometimes too many, sometimes too few, sometimes the wrong participants. Further ethnographic work will enable us to state the range of actual types of participant relations and to see in differential occurrence something to be explained.

Ethnographic material so far investigated indicates that some sixteen or seventeen components have sometimes to be distinguished. No rule has been found that requires specification of all simultaneously. There are always redundancies, and sometimes a rule requires explicit mention of a relation between only two, message form and some other. (It is a general principle that all rules involve message form, if not by affecting its shape, then by governing its interpretation.) Since each of the components may sometimes be a factor, however, each has to be recognized in the general grid.

Psycholinguistic work has indicated that human memory works best with classifications of the magnitude of seven, plus or minus two (Miller 1956). To make the set of components mnemonically convenient, at least in English, the letters of the term SPEAKING can be used. The components can be grouped together in relation to the eight letters without great difficulty. Clearly, the use of SPEAKING as a mnemonic code word has nothing to do with the form of an eventual model and theory.

1. *Message form.* The form of the message is fundamental, as has just been indicated. The most common, and most serious, defect in most reports of speaking probably is that the message form, and, hence, the rules governing it, cannot be recaptured. A concern for the details of actual form strikes some as picayune, as removed from humanistic or scientific importance. Such a view betrays an impatience that is a disservice to both humanistic and scientific purposes. It is precisely the failure to unite form and content in the scope of a single focus of study that has retarded understanding of the human ability to speak, and that vitiates many attempts to analyze the significance of behavior. Content categories, interpretive categories, alone do not suffice. It is a truism, but one frequently ignored in research, that *how* something is said is part of *what* is said. Nor can one prescribe in advance the gross size of the signal that will be crucial to content and skill. The more a way of speaking has become shared and meaningful within a group, the more likely that crucial cues will be efficient, i.e., slight in scale. If one balks at such detail, perhaps because it requires technical skills in linguistics, musicology, or the like that are hard to command, one should face the fact that the human meaning of one's object of study, and the scientific claims of one's field of inquiry, are not being taken seriously.

Especially when competence, the ability of persons, is of concern, one must recognize that shared ways of speaking acquire a partial autonomy, developing in part in terms of an inner logic of their means of expression. The means of expression condition and sometimes control content. For

members of the community, then, "freedom is the recognition of necessity"; mastery of the way of speaking is prerequisite to personal expression. Serious concern for both scientific analysis and human meaning requires one to go beyond content to the explicit statement of rules and features of form.

While such an approach may seem to apply first of all to genres conventionally recognized as esthetic, it also applies to conversation in daily life. Only painstaking analysis of message form—how things are said—of a sort that indeed parallels and can learn from the intensity of literary criticism can disclose the depth and adequacy of the elliptical art that is talk.

2. *Message content.* One context for distinguishing message form from message content would be: "He prayed, saying ' . . . '" (quoting message form) vs. "He prayed that he would get well" (reporting content only).

Content enters analysis first of all perhaps as a question of *topic*, and of change of topic. Members of a group know what is being talked about, and when what is talked about has changed, and manage maintenance, and change, of topic. These abilities are parts of their communicative competence of particular importance to study of the coherence of discourse.

Message form and message content are central to the speech act and the focus of its "syntactic structure"; they are also tightly interdependent. Thus they can be dubbed jointly as components of "act sequence" (mnemonically, A).

3. *Setting.* Setting refers to the time and place of a speech act and, in general, to the physical circumstances.

4. *Scene.* Scene, which is distinct from setting, designates the "psychological setting," or the cultural definition of an occasion as a certain type of scene. Within a play on the same stage with the same stage set the dramatic time may shift: "ten years later." In daily life the same persons in the same setting may redefine their interaction as a changed type of scene, say, from formal to informal, serious to festive, or the like. (For an example of the importance of types of scene to analysis of speech genres, see Frake's contrast of the Subanon and Yakan at the end of Chapter 3.) Speech acts frequently are used to define scenes, and also frequently judged as appropriate or inappropriate in relation to scenes. Settings and scenes themselves, of course, may be judged as appropriate and inappropriate, happy or unhappy, in relation to each other, from the level of complaint about the weather to that of dramatic irony.

Setting and scene may be linked as components of act situation (mnemonically, S). Since scene implies always an analysis of cultural definitions, setting probably is to be preferred as the informal, unmarked term for the two.

5. *Speaker, or sender.*

6. *Addressor.*

7. *Hearer, or receiver, or audience.*

8. *Addressee.*

These four components were discussed in introducing the subject of components of speech. Here are a few illustrations. Among the Abipon of Argentina *-in* is added to the end of each word if any participant (whatever his role) is a member of the Hocheri (warrior class). Among the Wishram Chinook, formal scenes are defined by the relationship between a source (e.g., a chief, or sponsor of a ceremony), a spokesman who repeats the source's words, and others who constitute an audience or public. The source whose words are repeated sometimes is not present; the addressees sometimes are spirits of the surrounding environment. In the presence of a child, adults in Germany often use the term of address which would be appropriate for the child. Sometimes rules for participants are internal to a genre and independent of the participants in the embedding event. Thus male and female actors in Yana myths use the appropriate men's and women's forms of speech, respectively, irrespective of the sex of the narrator. Use of men's speech itself is required when both addressor and addressee are both adult and male, "women's" speech otherwise. Groups differ in their definitions of the participants in speech events in revealing ways, particularly in defining absence (e.g., children, maids) and presence (e.g., supernaturals) of participation. Much of religious conduct can be interpreted as part of a native theory of communication. The various components may be grouped together as participants (mnemonically, P).

9. *Purposes—outcomes.* Conventionally recognized and expected outcomes often enter into the definition of speech events, as among the Waiwai of Venezuela, where the central speech event of the society, the *oho-chant*, has several varieties, according to whether the purpose to be accomplished is a marriage contract, a trade, a communal work task, an invitation to a feast, or a composing of social peace after a death. The rules for participants and settings vary accordingly (Fock 1965). A taxonomy of speech events among the Yakan of the Philippines (analyzed by Frake, Chapter 3) is differentiated into levels according jointly to topic (any topic, an issue, a disagreement, a dispute) and outcome (no particular outcome, a decision, a settlement, a legal ruling).

10. *Purposes—goals.* The purpose of an event from a community standpoint, of course, need not be identical to the purposes of those engaged in it. Presumably, both sides to a Yakan litigation wish to win. In a negotiation the purpose of some may be to obtain a favorable settlement, of others simply that there be a settlement. Among the Waiwai the prospective father-in-law and son-in-law have opposing goals in arriving at a marriage contract. The strategies of participants are an essential determinant of the form of speech events, indeed, to their being performed at all (see Blom and Gumperz 2, Chapter 14).

With respect both to outcomes and goals, the conventionally expected or ascribed must be distinguished from the purely situational or personal,

and from the latent and unintended. The interactions of a particular speech event may determine its particular quality and whether or not the expected outcome is reached. The actual motives, or some portion of them, of participants may be quite varied. In the first instance, descriptions of speech events seek to describe customary or culturally appropriate behavior. Such description is essential and prerequisite to understanding events in all their individual richness; but the two kinds of account should not be confused (see Sapir 1949h:534, 543).

Many approaches to communication and the analysis of speech have not provided a place for either kind of purpose, perhaps because of a conscious or unconsciously lingering behaviorism. [Kenneth Burke's (1945) approach is a notable exception.] Yet communication itself must be differentiated from interaction as a whole in terms of purposiveness (see Humes 1964e). The two aspects of purpose can be grouped together by exploiting an English homonymy, *ends* in view (goals) and *ends* as outcomes (mnemonically, E).

11. *Key*. Key is introduced to provide for the tone, manner, or spirit in which an act is done. It corresponds roughly to modality among grammatical categories. Acts otherwise the same as regards setting, participants, message form, and the like may differ in key, as, e.g., between *mock: serious* or *perfunctory: painstaking*.

Key is often conventionally ascribed to an instance of some other component as its attribute; seriousness, for example, may be the expected concomitant of a scene, participant, act, code, or genre (say, a church, a judge, a vow, use of Latin, obsequies). Yet there is always the possibility that there is a conventionally understood way of substituting an alternative key. (This possibility corresponds to the general possibility of choosing one speech style or register as against another.) In this respect, ritual remains always informative. Knowing what should happen next, one still can attend to the way in which it happens. (Consider, for example, critics reviewing performances of the classical repertoire for the piano.)

The significance of key is underlined by the fact that, when it is in conflict with the overt content of an act, it often overrides the latter (as in sarcasm). The signaling of key may be nonverbal, as with a wink, gesture, posture, style of dress, musical accompaniment, but it also commonly involves conventional units of speech too often disregarded in ordinary linguistic analysis, such as English aspiration and vowel length to signal emphasis. Such features are often termed *expressive*, but are better dubbed *stylistic* since they need not at all depend on the mood of their user. Revill (1966:251) reports, for instance, that "some forms have been found which *cannot* [emphasis mine] be described as reflecting feelings on the part of the speaker, but they will be used in certain social situations" (for emphasis, clarity, politeness).

12. *Channels*. By choice of channel is understood choice of oral, writ-

ten, telegraphic, semaphore, or other medium of transmission of speech. With regard to channels, one must further distinguish modes of use. The oral channel, e.g., may be used to sing, hum, whistle, or chant features of speech as well as to speak them. Two important goals of description are accounts of the interdependence of channels in interaction and the relative hierarchy among them.

13. *Forms of speech*. A major theoretical and empirical problem is to distinguish the verbal resources of a community. Obviously, it is superficial, indeed misleading, to speak of the language of a community (Ferguson and Gumperz 1960). Even where there is but a single "language" present in a community (no cases are known in the contemporary world), that language will be organized into various forms of speech. Three criteria seem to require recognition at the present time: the historical provenience of the language resources; presence or absence of mutual intelligibility; and specialization in use. The criteria often do not coincide. *Language* and *dialect* are suggested for the first; *codes* for the second; and *varieties* and *registers* for the third. One speaks normally of the English language, and of dialects of English, wherever forms of speech are found whose content is historically derived from the line of linguistic tradition we call "English." The different dialects are not always mutually intelligible (see Yorkshire and Indian English), and their social functions vary considerably around the world, from childhood vernacular to bureaucratic lingua franca. "Code" suggests decoding and the question of intelligibility. Unintelligibility may result when speech is in a language historically unrelated to one's own, but also from use of a simple transformation of one's own speech, e.g., Pig Latin, or "op" talk. In short, some forms of speech derive from others by addition, deletion, substitution, and permutation in various combinations. Finally, forms of speech are commonly specialized to uses of various sorts. *Register* has become familiar in English linguistic usage for reference to specific situations; *varieties*, or "functional varieties," has been used in American linguistics in relation to broad domains (e.g., vernacular vs. standard).

For sociolinguistics, *varieties* has priority as a standpoint from which to view the forms of speech of a community. The criteria of provenience and intelligibility have to do with sources and characteristics of the criterion of use with the functional organization, of the forms of speech. Channels and forms of speech can be joined together as means or agencies of speaking and labeled, partly for the sake of the code word, partly with an eye on the use of the term *instrumental* in grammar, as *instrumentalities* (mnemonically, I).

14. *Norms of interaction*. All rules governing speaking, of course, have a normative character. What is intended here are the specific behaviors and proprieties that attach to speaking—that one must not interrupt, for example, or that one may freely do so; that normal voice should not be

used except when scheduled in a church service (whisper otherwise); that turns in speaking are to be allocated in a certain way. Norms of interaction obviously implicate analysis of social structure, and social relationships generally, in a community. An illustration follows:

The next morning during tea with Jikjitsu, a college professor who rents rooms in one of the Sodo buildings came in and talked of koans. "When you understand Zen, you know that the tree is really *there*."—The only time anyone said anything of Zen philosophy or experience the whole week. Zenbos never discuss koans or sanzen experience with each other (Snyder 1969:52).

15. *Norms of interpretation.* An account of norms of interaction may still leave open the interpretation to be placed upon them, especially when members of different communities are in communication. Thus it is clear that Arabic and American students differ on a series of interactional norms: Arabs confront each other more directly (face to face) when conversing, sit closer to each other, are more likely to touch each other, look each other more squarely in the eye, and converse more loudly (Watson and Graves 1966:976–977). The investigators who report these findings themselves leave open the meanings of these norms to the participants (p. 984).

The problem of norms of interpretation is familiar from the assessment of communications from other governments and national leaders. One often looks for friendliness in lessened degree of overt hostility. Relations between groups within a country are often affected by misunderstandings on this score. For white middle-class Americans, for example, normal hesitation behavior involves "fillers" at the point of hesitation ("uh," etc.). For many blacks, a normal pattern is to recycle to the beginning of the utterance (perhaps more than once). This black norm may be interpreted by whites not as a different norm but as a defect. (I owe this example to David Dalby.)

Norms of interpretation implicate the belief system of a community. The classic precedent in the ethnographic analysis of a language is Malinowski's (1935) treatment of Trobriand magical formulas and ritual under the heading of *dogmatic context*. (Malinowski's other rubrics are roughly related to these presented here in the following way: His *sociological context* and *ritual context* subsume information as to setting, participants, ends in view and outcome, norms of interaction, and higher level aspects of genre; *structure* reports salient patterning of the verbal form of the act or event; *mode of recitation* reports salient characteristics of the vocal aspect of channel use and message form.)

The processes of interpretation discussed by Garfinkel (Chapter 10), including "ad hocing" generally, would belong in this category. These two kinds of norms may be grouped together (mnemonically, N).

16. *Genres.* By genres are meant categories such as poem, myth, tale, proverb, riddle, curse, prayer, oration, lecture, commercial, form letter, editorial, etc. From one standpoint the analysis of speech into acts is an analysis of speech into instances of genres. The notion of genre implies the possibility of identifying formal characteristics traditionally recognized. It is heuristically important to proceed as though all speech has formal characteristics of some sort as manifestation of genres; and it may well be true (on genres, see Ben-Amos 1969). The common notion of "casual" or unmarked speech, however, points up the fact that there is a great range among genres in the number of and explicitness of formal markers. At least there is a great range in the ease with which such markers have been identified. It remains that "unmarked" casual speech can be recognized as such in a context where it is not expected or where it is being exploited for particular effect. Its lesser visibility may be a function of our own orientations and use of it; its profile may be as sharp as any other, once we succeed in seeing it as strange.

Genres often coincide with speech events, but must be treated as analytically independent of them. They may occur in (or as) different events. The sermon as a genre is typically identical with a certain place in a church service, but its properties may be invoked, for serious or humorous effect, in other situations. Often enough a genre recurs in several events, such as a genre of chanting employed by women in Bihar state in India; it is the prescribed form for a related set of acts, recurring in weddings, family visits, and complaints to one's husband (K. M. Tiwary, personal communication). A great deal of empirical work will be needed to clarify the interrelations of genres, events, acts, and other components (mnemonically, G).

As has been shown, the sixteen components can be grouped together under the letters of the code word SPEAKING: settings, participants, ends, act sequences, keys, instrumentalities, norms, genres. That the code word is not wholly ethnocentric appears from the possibility of re-labeling and regrouping the necessary components in terms of the French PARLANT: *participants, actes, raison (resultat), locale, agents* (instrumentalities), *normes, ton (key), types* (genres).

Rules (Relations) of Speaking. In discovering the local system of speaking, certain familiar guidelines are, of course, to be used. One must determine the local taxonomy of terms as an essential, though never perfect, guide. A shift in any of the components of speaking may mark the presence of a rule (or structured relation), e.g., from normal tone of voice to whisper, from formal English to slang, correction, praise, embarrassment, withdrawal, and other evaluative responses to speech may indicate the violation or accomplishment of a rule. In general, one can

think of any change in a component as a potential locus for application for a "sociolinguistic" commutation test: What relevant contrast, if any, is present?

The heuristic set of components should be used negatively as well as positively, i.e., if a component seems irrelevant to certain acts or genres, that should be asserted, and the consequences of the assertion checked. In just this way Arewa and Dundes (1964) discovered additional aspects of the use of proverbs among the Yoruba: Channel had seemed irrelevant (or rather, always spoken). Pressing the point led to recognition of a change in the form of proverbs when drummed, in keeping with a pattern of partial repetition particular to drumming. Again, the status of participant (user) as adult seemed invariant. Pressing the point by stating it as a rule led to discovery of a formulaic apology by which a child could make use of proverbs.

Many generalizations about rules of speaking will take the form of statements of relationship among components. It is not yet clear that there is any priority to be assigned to particular components in such statements. So far as one can tell at present, any component may be taken as starting point, and the others viewed in relation to it. When individual societies have been well analyzed, hierarchies of precedence among components will very likely appear and be found to differ from case to case. Such differences in hierarchy of components will then be an important part of the taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems. For one group, rules of speaking will be heavily bound to setting; for another primarily to participants; for a third, perhaps to topic.

Experimentation with the formal statement of rules of speaking has only recently begun. (See Tyler's informal examples in Chapter 8, and Ervin-Tripp's pioneering survey, with many original points, in Chapter 7.) Work of Joel Sherzer and myself with some ethnographic data suggested the possibility of adapting a syntactic mode of statement. In such a format, features holding throughout a speech event are stated at the outset in a sort of "lexicon" of components. The sequential structure of the act itself is stated in a sort of "syntax" by means of rewriting rules (Chomsky 1965). When prose descriptions of events have been so restated, there has been a considerable gain in understanding of structure; or, one might say, a considerable clarification of what one understood to be the structure has been demanded. The form of the event is disengaged, as it were, from the verbal foliage obligatory in prose sentences, and can be more readily seen. In order to compare events within a society, and across societies, some concise and standard formats are needed. Comparison cannot depend upon memorization or shuffling of prose paragraphs vastly different in verbal style. And it is through some form of formal statement that one can commit oneself to a precise claim as to what it is a member of society knows in knowing how to participate in a speech act.

Abipon "Scoring" (= G)

1. *Event: shaman's retribution (minor offense)*

<i>Components:</i>	S	→	shaman's house
	P	→	(1) shaman, (2) offender shaman → [-female] offender → person identified by shaman as responsible for a misfortune
	E	→	[to punish offender] [to test courage?]
	K	→	ritual seriousness
	I	→	Abipon language, fish (<i>palometa</i>) jaw
	N	→	[-speech] = [courage] [+speech] = [cowardice]
<i>Sequence:</i>		→	call + scoring
	Call	→	?
	Scoring	→	(P1) {piercing} + (P2) response [response]
	(P2) Response	→	[-avoidance, -speech] [+avoidance, +speech]
	(P1) Response	→	[R1] / [-avoidance, -speech] [R1 + R2] / [+avoidance, +speech]
	R1	→	reproach in name of ancestral spirit and tradi- tions for initial offense
	R2	→	Reproach in name of ancestral spirit for offense of cowardice

2. *Event: girl's puberty rite*

<i>Components:</i>	S	→	shaman's house
	P	→	(1) shaman, (2) girl shaman → [+female, +old] girl → [+female, +marriageable age (ca. 20)]
	E	→	[to identify girl as marriageable] [to beautify girl] [to test/manifest girl's courage]
	K	→	ritual seriousness
	I	→	Abipon language, thorns
	N	→	[-speech + courage] [+speech + cowardice]
<i>Sequence:</i>		→	(?call) + scoring
	Scoring	→	(P1) {pricking} + (P2) response [response]
	(P2) Response	→	[-avoidance, -speech] [+avoidance, +speech]
	(P1) Response	→	[?] / [-avoidance, -speech] [R2 + R2] / [+avoidance, +speech]
	R2	→	reproach in name of ancestral spirit and tradi- tions for cowardice

R3	→	taunt of future spinsterhood
3. <i>Event: testing of children</i>		
Components: S	→	parent's home?
P	→	(P1) parent, (P2) child
E	→	to teach receiver's role in ritual taunting to teach, test courage (?)
K	→	?
I	→	Abipon language
N	→	$\left[\begin{array}{l} -\text{speech} + \text{courage} \\ +\text{speech} + \text{cowardice} \end{array} \right]$
Sequence:	→	(?) + scoring
"Scoring"	→	(P1) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{taunt} \\ \text{response} \end{array} \right\}$ + (P2) response
Taunt	→	??
(P2) Response	→	$\left[\begin{array}{l} -\text{speech} \\ +\text{speech} \end{array} \right]$
(P1) Response	→	$\left[\begin{array}{l} ? (\text{praise?}) \\ \text{R2} \end{array} \right] / \left[\begin{array}{l} -\text{speech} \\ +\text{speech} \end{array} \right]$

It was the explicit analysis of the more formally defined events that led Sherzer to notice features of the same sort in the casual mention by the source of an informal use of speech by parents. More than one mode of formal (explicit) statement obviously might be attempted—the format used here differs from that in Sherzer (1967) and also in minor details from the revised format of Sherzer (1970). The point is that to put the analysis in such a format forces one to confront what prose may let escape: Just exactly what does one's information specify, and what does it fail to specify, about those features? The task of presentation in a format—something that can take a good deal of time to do consistently and exhaustively—forces attention to structure, and brings out the parallelism in organization of these events, as well as the revealing differences—the relative hierarchy, e.g., of piercing with a fish jaw, pricking with thorns, and purely verbal taunting, covarying with the relative hierarchy of the initiator's response to silence, single reproach (R1), silence, and perhaps praise, in keeping with the general ends in view, punishment, initiation, and training. The parallel structure suggests the exploitation of the several sense of the English word "scoring" for the initiator's first action, and would direct attention (were the Abipones still extant) to behavior equivalent to the call of the shaman's retribution that might be found with the other two events.

The labeling of the acts is unavoidably somewhat arbitrary. We cannot now determine how the Abipones would have translated "taunting" and "reproach," e.g., nor whether they would have distinguished the two as is done here. While the terms overlap in their senses in English, it is rea-

sonable to use "reproach" with regard to offenses (cause of a misfortune, offense against traditions by replying to "scoring"), and "taunting" otherwise, while following Sherzer in choosing "taunting" for the general category. Information from other indigenous South American cultures, and general theory of speech acts, may later support or change the interpretation.

The analysis has been from the "syntactic" standpoint of the component of act sequence. The analysis also makes possible the standpoint of categories or a "lexicon" of acts. The first participants acts of scoring and response can be somewhat as subcategorization in the context either of the event or the component of the second participant:

Scoring	→	[piercing]/[Shaman's retribution] or [offender] [pricking]/[Girl's puberty rite] or [marriageable girl] [taunting]/[training of child] or [child]
Taunting (P1)Response	→	$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{R1} + (\text{R2}) \\ (\text{R2} + \text{R3}) \\ (\text{R2}) \end{array} \right] / \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{as above} \\ \text{as above} \end{array} \right]$

We do not know the message form of the initial taunting or response which might lead to further specification. The second participant's response is constant throughout the three events on the level at which we have information, but again, might be subcategorized if message form were known.

All three kinds of acts can also be seen as entries in a communicative lexicon, where the familiar formulation $X \rightarrow$ (is rewritten, or realized, as) Y /(in the context) $W-Z$, can be adapted to read, X (has the value) Y /(in the context) $W-Z$.

Scoring	→	[punishment]/[shaman's retribution] [offender] [initiation]/[girl's puberty rite] or [marriageable girl] [training]/[testing of child] [child]
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The second participant's alternative responses have the same meaning throughout: courage/cowardice. Perhaps it is not accidental that the one insight into verbal socialization that we have from Dobrizhoffer fits with a society in which no valued adult role depended upon verbal skill.

Such a mode of analysis permits formal treatment of many of the acts of speech. The conventional means of many such functions can indeed be analyzed as relations among components, e.g., message form, genre, and key in the case of the $-y$ form of the accusative plural of masculine nouns in Polish, which has the value "solemn" in the genre of poetry, and the value "ironic, pejorative" in the genres of nonpoetic speech. Functions themselves may be statable in terms of relations among components, such that poetic function, e.g., may require a certain relationship among

choice of code, choice of topic, and message form in a given period or society.

It would be misleading, however, to think that the definition of functions can be reduced to or derived from other components. Such a thought would be a disabling residue of behaviorist ideology. Ultimately, the functions served in speech must be derived directly from the purposes and needs of human persons engaged in social action, and are what they are: talking to seduce, to stay awake, to avoid a war. The formal analysis of speaking is a means to the understanding of human purposes and needs, and their satisfaction; it is an indispensable means, but only a means, and not that understanding itself.

Explanation

Beyond description is the task of devising models of explanation. The many kinds of act and genre of speech are not all universal; each has a history, and a set of conditions for its origin, maintenance, change, and loss. All the questions that attach to explanation in social science—questions of primacy of factors (technology, social structure, values, and the like), considerations of areal patterning, diffusion, independent development, and evolution, will impinge. If the kind of explanatory adequacy discussed by Chomsky (1965) is recognized as “essential,” i.e., as concerned with what is internal to language, and beyond that, internal to human nature, we can see the need for an “existential” or “experiential” explanatory adequacy, a kind of explanation that will link speaking with human history and praxis (Petrovich 1967:111–118, 126–127, 171–172; LeFebvre 1968:34, 45–46). To do this is not only to see languages as part of systems of speaking but also to see systems of speaking from the standpoint of the central question of the nature of sociocultural order—a theory of the maintenance of order being understood as implying a corresponding theory of change, and conversely.¹⁰

Each case, or each type of case, to be sure, may be valued in its own

¹⁰ See Cohen 1968. His cogent, penetrating account takes explanation as fundamental to theory and social order as central to what is to be explained (pp. x, 16, Chapter 2). Cohen speaks simply of “social order.” I use “sociocultural order” to make explicit the inclusion of symbolic or cognitive order (see Berger 1967). On the relevance of sociolinguistics, note the introduction by Donald MacRae (center p. x). On an adequate theory of linguistic change, see Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968, especially pp. 100–101: “The key to a rational conception of language change—indeed, of language itself—is the possibility of describing orderly differentiation in a language serving a community . . . native like command of heterogeneous structures is not a matter of multidialectalism or “mere” performance, but is part of unilingual linguistic competence . . . in a language serving a complex (i.e., real) community, it is *absence* of structured heterogeneity that would be dysfunctional” (101). The conclusions (187–188) make clear that an adequate theory must be sociolinguistic and be based on sociolinguistic description.

right as an expression of mankind. My own work stems in part from a desire to understand the meanings of language in individual lives, and to work toward ending the frequent alienation from human beings of something human beings have created (see Berger 1967, Chapter 1, especially pp. 12–13, and notes 1, 2, and 11; Lefebvre 1966: Chapter VIII, and 1968:72–74; and Merleau-Ponty 1967). Individuating, interpretive, and phenomenological motives are consistent with a concern for general, causal explanation. Each case and type is valuable, enlarging and testing general knowledge, and it is only with a general view of conditions and possibilities that the value of individual ways of speaking can be accurately assessed.

We require a widely ranging series of descriptions, whatever the motives that severally produce them. Neither a descriptive model nor an explanatory theory is convincing if it has not met the test of diverse situations, of a general body of data. Recall that Darwin’s exposition of natural selection, and Tylor’s (1871, Chapter I) of exposition of a science of culture, were convincing in part for such a reason. We require some initial ordering of the diversity, although the ordering need not be conceived as either historical or unique. Sociolinguistic description and taxonomy are joint conditions of success for understanding and explaining the interaction of language and social life.